






Determinants of Protests: Longitudinal 











MICROCON Research Working Paper 30 
Carlos Bozzoli and Tilman Brück 
 

















Correct citation: Bozzoli, C. and Brück, T., 2010. Determinants of Protests: Longitudinal 
Evidence from Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. MICROCON Research Working Paper 30, 
Brighton: MICROCON 
 
First published in 2010 
© Carlos Bozzoli and Tilman Brück 2010 
ISBN 978 1 85864 941 2 
 
 
For further information, please contact: 
MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict, Institute of Development Studies 
at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE 
Tel: +44 (0)1273 872891 
Email: info@microconflict.eu 










2 and Tilman Brück
3 
 
MICROCON Research Working Paper 30 
July 2010 
 
Abstract: This paper is the first study that analyzes the drivers of political protest using 
longitudinal data from a critical revolution that changed –at least temporarily– the political 
landscape in a transition country. We make use of a rich dataset consisting of panel data 
collected before and after the so called “Orange” revolution in Ukraine. Our empirical 
approach tackles two different –and equally interesting– features of the revolution: the 
determinants of participation (both in the protests and counter-protests) and the “selection” of 
participants into different levels of involvement (i.e. intensity of participation). We consider 
different drivers of participation, from traditional proxies for opportunities and grievances, 
but we also analyze the role of political and economic preferences, risk tolerance, life 
satisfaction, and indicators of network connectivity. What emerges from this study is a more 
nuanced pattern of participation that does not link uniquely to a single theoretical model. 
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1.  Introduction 
There is a widespread interest to understand the micro-processes of revolutionary 
mobilization and leadership. In the recent years, much of the literature has concentrated on 
understanding rebel recruitment (Weinstein 2007, Humpreys and Weinstein, 2008). There is 
also need to understand what drives protests that afflict poor countries but also transition 
economies with higher levels of income. 
 
This is the first study that analyzes the drivers of political protest using longitudinal data from 
a critical uprising that changed –at least temporarily– the political landscape in a transition 
country. We make use of a rich dataset consisting of panel data collected before and after the 
so called “Orange” revolution in Ukraine. 
 
This study focuses on Ukraine, a young democracy that experienced a dramatic transition 
from a collective to a market oriented economy. This transition was painful by economic 
accounts: the depth and duration of the economic contraction surpasses even statistics coming 
from the Great Depression. Political grievances, led by allegations of fraud, autocratic 
tendencies, and a lack of freedom of speech are indeed in the background of the so-called 
“Orange” revolution that occurred after the elections of 2004. 
 
Our contribution to the literature on protests goes beyond the advantage of using of 
longitudinal data. The richness of our dataset allows us to understand not only drivers, but 
also different degrees of “activity” (intensity) of participants and protest dynamics. Moreover, 
we go further from the usual theoretical motives of participation, testing the role of risk 





Our empirical approach tackles two different –and equally interesting– features of the 
revolution: the determinants of participation, and the “selection” of participants into different 
levels of involvement. First, we consider protest and counter-protest participants, and find a 
different profile of participants on these groups. We find that “protestors” (“Orange 
revolutionaries”) counted on students, and involved individuals aligned on strong political 
preferences. Surprisingly, both in multivariate and bivariate analysis, protestors displayed 
high levels of life satisfaction. This is not counterintuitive given the context in which the 
protest occurred: individuals with high satisfaction may protest against what they consider 
“unfair”, fueled by the perception that results of a decisive election were fraudulent. 
Counterrevolutionaries (“Blue”, aligned with the then ruling party) were more likely to have 
endured difficulties in the transition to a market economy: individuals in long-term 
unemployment were more likely to be part of this group. Our findings also suggest the 
necessity of coordination for these events to occur: protests were more likely to occur in 
densely populated areas, and in individuals more likely to have access to networks (proxied 
by having access to internet, mobile or land line phone). Also, public employees were more 
likely to participate in counterdemonstrations than the average citizen. What protestors and 
counter-protestors had in common is a low level of risk aversion, which is consistent with 
perceptions that participating is less “risky” than not participating.  
 
Second, we divide participants (only in the Orange side) in two groups: “followers” and 
“organizers”, the latter being more “active” in the demonstrations than the former. Many 
interesting results emerge comparing these categories. Students are more likely to participate 
as “followers”, but this does not make them more likely to be “organizers” (in relation to non 
participants). Education does not significantly increase the chances of being “followers”, but 
does increase the chances of being “organizers”. Women are as likely as men to be  
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“followers”, but they are substantially less likely to participate as “organizers”. Finally, 
political preferences increase the chances of being “follower” and “organizers”, but its effect 
is stronger for organizers. In sum, women and students appear to be driving those engaging in 
moderate participation, whereas to be “organizer” requires political motivation and higher 
levels of education. What emerges from this study is a more nuanced pattern of participation 
that does not link uniquely to a single theoretical model. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides basic details about the context in which 
the protests occurred. Section 3 outlines a basic conceptual framework to integrate the context 
in a broader theoretical and empirical perspective. Section 4 describes the findings and 
problematic of empirical studies dealing with collective action in the form of protests. Section 
5 presents the main results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The case of Ukraine 
Why study Ukraine?  
There are many reasons that make Ukraine a unique setting for analyzing protest behavior. 
First, although not a poor country, Ukraine experienced a long-lasting influence from the 
USSR, and after the demise of the soviet bloc it experienced a protracted period of economic 
depression that surpasses in comparison statistics from the Great Depression. In fact, even in 
comparison with other Eastern European transition countries, Ukraine had a very difficult 
period of transformation. The Ukrainian economy experienced 10 consecutive years of output 
decline in the 1990s: by year 2000, the Ukrainian real GDP represented only 43% of its level 
in 1990. The labor market responded to this adjustment with a sharp contraction in real wages 
and a large incidence of wage arrears and (unpaid) forced leave (Brück et al. 2008).  In 
addition to this, between 1991 and 1994 the country experienced a severe episode  
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hyperinflation that eroded the value of household savings in real terms. All these factors may 
have led to discontent in a large proportion of the population. 
 
Second, Ukraine is still a young democracy, and its political leaders have been criticized by 
opponents for corruption and for concentrating political power. In fact, as in other former 
territories of the USSR, Ukraine underwent a difficult political transition to capitalism and 
democracy. This path was not free of political protest. In particular, since the turn of the 
century the so-called “colored” revolutions have occurred in other CIS countries (Belarus, 
Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan) besides Ukraine. These protests aimed at changing political 
leadership and to demand transparent elections and free press, and raise the question of 
whether the sources of discontent were of political, rather than economic nature. 
 
Third, the country displays clear regional differences. For instance, the Western part of the 
country is more wary of establishing close relations with Russia and displays a strong 
Ukrainian nationalistic identification, whereas the East welcomes Russian influence in 
economic, political and cultural terms. A similar division in language and identity is clear 
between these two regions and correlates with strong polarization in electoral results. 
In Central and Southern regions (and Kiev, the capital) such contrasts are less evident. Thus, 
we investigate to what extent the emergence of protests correlates with cultural and ethnic 
differences. 
 
The Orange revolution 
Ukraine has a multi-party political system. Presidential elections, which are held every 5 
years, took place in 2004. Two main candidates gained majority approval: Viktor 
Yushchenko, leaning towards EU/US and NATO, and Viktor Yanukovich (an incumbent, at 
that time Prime Minister), leaning towards Russia. In the first election, no candidate reached  
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the majority of votes, so according to electoral rules, a run-off vote between Yuschenko and 
Yanukovych was scheduled for November 21
st, 2004. In contradiction with exit-polls (which 
assigned Yuschenko a lead by about 11% margin), the official results gave the win to 
Yanukovyich by 3% margin. Peaceful protests occurred almost immediately, grounded on 
allegations of electoral fraud. Some of these protests drew a substantial number of 
participants: in Kiev, 500000 participants gathered on November 23
rd to march in front of the 
Parliament. In Central and Western Ukraine, protests in favor of Yuschenko were common in 
urban centers, but in Eastern Ukraine counter demonstrations were held in favor of 
Yanukovych. Both types of demonstrations also converged towards Kiev, although “Orange” 
supporters (Yuschenko) outnumbered participants in Yanukovych “Blue” side. 
The Supreme Court intervened, and ordered a re-run of vote for December 26
th, which was 
closely monitored by international electoral authorities. In this third election, Yuschenko was 
elected new president by 52% of votes. This brought an end to the “Orange Revolution”.  
 
 
3. Conceptual Framework  
Social unrest is quite a common phenomenon in developing countries. The International 
Peace Research Institute (PRIO) has documented 3375 politically motivated events of social 
disorder in cities of Asia and Africa in the last 4 decades (Urdal, 2008). The occurrence of this 
events is in conflict with Olson’s seminal contribution (Olson, 1971), which suggests that 
coordination problems may prevent collective action from occurring, “unless the number of 
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device 
to make individuals act in their common interest” (Olson 1971: 1-2). The essence of Olson’s 
argument is that there is a “free-rider” problem that deters rational individuals from 
participating. This theoretical result is not surprising if the consequences of a revolution are 
considered a “public good” (Tullock, 1971), and hence liable to “underprovision” problems. 
The gap between Olson’s skeletal model predictions and the empirical observation (where  
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revolutions and other forms of social unrest do occur) was subsequently reduced by relaxing 
Olson’s assumptions. Many extensions to Olson’s model have been suggested (for a survey 
article, see Moore, 1995). Instead of detailing all theoretical extensions, which would exceed 
the scope of this paper, we briefly sketch the main theoretical lines that have been proposed to 
explain the occurrence of collective action phenomena. In the remainder of this section, we 
put particular emphasis in linking theoretical factors with testable empirical predictions, 
considering potential empirical correlates (“drivers”) of participation. 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the central problem facing an agent deciding to join a popular 
protest is to compare costs and benefits of joining (or not), which may be of economic or 
psychological nature. That is, there are different factors that may incentive (disincentive) an 
individual’s decision to join (not to join) a protest. In order to structure the presentation, we 
divide these incentives in different categories. In particular, following the recent literature on 
the determinants of civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), we propose the following 
characterization along three categories: greed, grievance and group motives. (A similar 
structure is provided by Humpreys and Weinstein, 2008). This differentiation helps to contrast 
different hypothesis and mechanisms lying behind the decision to participate in a protest, but 
does not imply a simple mapping of circumstances occurring in violent conflict regions with 
those occurring in Ukraine in 2004.  
 
Greed  
Our first category, greed, comprises material incentives that deter or incentive participation 
(Tullock, 1971). Examples of these are rewards from looting or sanctions to participants, for 
instance job loss or expropriation. A key challenge in assessing the relevance of greed 
motives is to match theoretical concepts with their empirical counterpart. In the Ukrainian 
case, we use two main sets of variables of interest that proxy for material sanctions or benefits  
8 
 
linked to participation. The first set includes variables describing employment status, which 
matter for two reasons: opportunity costs and risks of being fired. First, other things equal, 
employed individuals may not have sufficient time to contribute to protests with their 
presence in public demonstrations because being employed may constrain the number of 
hours available for alternative activities. The variable worked, defined Table 1 serves as a 
proxy for this purpose. Second, participating in protests against status quo may carry high 
risks for specific types of jobs. For example, public employees (variable emppublic in Table 
1) may avoid participating in a rebellion because of the risk of being fired if the revolution 
fails
4. The second set of variables includes an indicator of property ownership (in our case 
proxied by variables that signal property holidings: owning a house, ownshouse; and owning 
additional property besides the main place of residence, ownsmore). Owners, especially those 
holding substantial amounts of wealth, may be deterred from participating in protests because 
of the risk of expropriation, although this may not hold in the case of Ukraine. 
 
Grievance 
This category encompasses different sources of discontent or frustration that propel 
participation. These factors could be economic, political, ethnic or religious in nature. In our 
case, we capture economic sources of grievance by using information about the poverty status 
of the household. This goes in line with absolute deprivation theories that suggest that 
rebellions are (at least partly) driven by poverty. Because participation could be non-
monotonic on the degree of poverty, we use two poverty thresholds to create alternative 
poverty categories: poor (captured by the indicator poorpr) and food poor (poorfr). 
 
Through a detailed retrospective questionnaire, we are also able to identify other causes of 
economic grievances, such as employment difficulties during the transition (jobslost8697), 
                                                 
4 This could work in the opposite way, too, but only if the chances of the revolution being successful are high.  
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fraction of time unemployed in the period 1998/2004 (fracunemp9804), and job-related 
problems (wage arrears, being on forced leave or unemployed) in the previous year, for the 
individual (jobprobl12M) or for at least one member in the household (jobprobl12Mhh). Poor 
labor market outcomes in the past may build feelings of frustrations that make individuals 
more likely to protest. This categorization is not completely free of problems: being 
unemployed could signal reduced opportunity costs, which would fall under the “greed” 
category. The temporal dimension may help to solve this problem: current employment status 
is more likely to reflect opportunity costs than grievances, whereas chronic employment 
problems are more likely to reflect deep-seated sources of discontent. Notice that our proxies 
of economic sources of grievance are related to the individual (or their household), and are 
not group-based.  We measure political grievances indirectly by using indicators for political 
(westdem, soviet) and economic preferences (suitcentral, suitmarket), as described in detail on 
Table 1. These preferences do not capture discontent per se, but can become grievances when 
the status quo openly challenges individual preferences. Given the ideology of Yuschenko 
and Yanukovych followers, we expect that individuals leaning towards EU/UE and favouring 
market oriented policies are more likely to participate for the “Orange” side. Supporters of 
centralized economy and leaning toward Russia would be more likely to participate for the 
“Blue” side. It is important to underline that grievance factors need to be grounded in some 
state of discontent (or gap between expectations and actual rewards). Different factors that we 
have described above (e.g. unemployment) may proxy for discontent, but it is difficult to 
identify them as clear-cut candidates for grievances, since they may also proxy for greed 
motives (opportunity costs may be lower). We do not have a direct measure of discontent on 
political terms, such as an indicator of being alienated from the political debate. We have 
instead an indicator of life satisfaction (lifesatplus), but the predicted sign of this is unclear 







Individuals may also join a protest because they feel strongly identified or desire to conform 
to social, ethnic or religious groups to which they pertain. That is, regardless of their 
individual reasons for participation (e.g. being poor, feeling alienated from the political 
process), they feel strongly identified with a social group and use protest (or abstaining from 
protest) as a way to “conform” to norms or expectations advocated by reference group. For 
this purpose we use an indicator that Ukrainian is the preferred language (ukrainian).  
Finally, because participation may be less likely if coordination among individuals fail, we 
use proxies for social connections. We construct an index of social exchange based on 
information on gifts/money received and/or given to/from others, including relatives, friends 
or organizations. This is a crude measure of social connections, but it is one of the few 
measures that can be constructed from ULMS data. We have also used other indicators of 
connectivity (access to internet, having a cell-land line telephone), but these may also proxy 
for socioeconomic status, so that their effect may be partly confounded. 
 
Other hypotheses of interest 
This sub-section describes other variables of interest that do not pertain to the three categories 
mentioned before, but that are of interest as a potential driver of participation. These 
hypotheses have not been tested in the literature and constitute a clear research gap that is 
worth exploring given the richness of richness of the ULMS longitudinal dataset. 
  First, it is possible that attitudes towards risk are an important factor driving individual 
participation. On the one hand, the uncertainty linked to participation may deter individuals 
with high risk aversion from participating (Snijders & Raub, 1998). On the other, not 
participating may also have associated risks and thus individuals may choose to participate in  
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revolts. Thus the sign will depend on which action is more “risky” (joining or not joining). 
The theoretical argument goes as follows: for an individual with constant absolute risk 
aversion utility (CARA) and with payoffs from actions (joining-not joining) that are normally 
distributed. Assume joining a protest has a stochastic return (reward) J that is normally 
distributed with mean   J μ and variance 
2
J σ . If the individual has a CARA utility u(x)=-exp(-
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participation will be decreasing in risk aversion when joining the protest is more “risky” (in 
Arrow-Pratt’s relative risk aversion sense) than not joining. To evaluate the impact of risk 
aversion on participation, we use an index of risk aversion (see Appendix 1 for more details) 
that is constructed from choosing “lotteries” with increasing risk aversion.  
Second, we would like to know the role of potential social deterrence factors at the local level. 
For this purpose, we use electoral results as an indicator of political sentiment at the regional 
level. The argument behind this is that, other things equal, a would-be “Orange” protester 
would be less likely to participate in a “Blue” region. The sanctions that we allude to may be 
diverse. First, one would expect less “Orange” participants in a “Blue” region, which would 
by itself reduce the propensity to participate because the expectation of “local” success would 
be minimal. This argument goes in line with collective rationality (Finkel & Muller, 1998)  
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and with “tipping point” models (Schelling 1985; D’Anieri 2006; Chong 1991; Lohmann 
1992). Second, less participants increases the chances that the protest will be controlled by the 
state, because the ratio of state control agents (police, military) to participants might be higher 
in regions where there is low expected turnout for the “Orange” side. This last argument is 
weakened if the regional distribution of state control forces is endogenous to discontent: 
“Orange” regions may have a higher degree of state control because they were considered 
more likely to harbour revolts.  
 
In addition to these variables, we also make use of the following controls: age (age), gender 
(female), educational categories (primedu, gensec, profsec, highered) , and geographic 
indicators (town/city as a proxy for population density, which could also capture variation in 
unobserved network sizes), and West/East/South/Kiev/Center for geographic regions), 
household size (hhsize), and the share of working age adults in the household (name, women 
ages 15-55, men ages 15-60) as a proxy for household composition (workageshare). 
 
4. Related literature  
 
Eliciting the determinants of collective action is a difficult task, for different reasons. This is 
evident in the shortcomings that plague most of the empirical literature on this topic. First, in 
many studies participants are asked ex post about their reasons for participation (e.g. Opp, 
1994). This approach can yield biased results, as ex post respondents may give socially 
acceptable answers when probed about motives of participation. Ex post “rationalizations” 
(Finkel and Müller, 1998: 38) can obscure the real motivations that were behind participation. 
In addition to this, ex post studies may result in confounding due to reverse causality. This is 
particularly likely because participating in collective action can notably change attitudes and 
economic outcomes. Second, analysing the willingness or intention to revolt (derived from  
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attitudinal surveys) can lead to highly speculative results (e.g.MacCulloch, 2002). The reason 
for this is that stated attitudes in response to a hypothetical situation can significantly differ 
from observed behaviour (Lober, 1995).  These two shortcomings are related to cross-
sectional data, where information is either collected before (or alluding to a hypothetical 
event) or after the occurrence of a revolution. Longitudinal datasets may be better suited for 
our empirical quest. 
 
Few studies have used panel data to analyze determinants of protest. Finkel and  Müller 
(1998) use a panel survey of 377 individuals in the former West Germany. Their data was 
collected between November 1987 and January 1988 and between October 1989 and January 
1990. Although their survey items allow for a clean identification of drivers in the from of 
expected costs and benefits, their measure of participation is an index that encompasses 
different activities of political participation that vary in nature and severity, from wearing a 
“button or a sticker for a political cause” to “confrontations with police”, participation “in 
political activities that resulted in property damage” or “in a demonstration that broke the 
law”. This is done to maximize sample variation, but obscures motives determining intensity 
of participation (number of activities) from participation itself (whether the person 
participated in at least one type of political protest). Unlike their paper, we use a larger sample 
size survey that allows us to analyze participation and intensity separately, thus obtaining a 
clearer perspective. In addition to this, we focus on participation in a revolutionary protest 
that occurred in a specific period of time.  
 
Bäck et al (2004) study different modes of political participation (voting, party activity, and 
participation in manifestations) using panel data from Sweden (2 waves, 1997 and 1999). 
Most of their dependent variables are constructed as additive indexes (as in Finkel and 
Müller), and motivate the same comments raised before. Furhter, it is not clear from their  
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results whether the low response rates and high frequence of attrition of the study were 
appropriately handled. 
 
In sum, this is the first longitudinal study focusing on participation in a massive revolutionary protest. 
 
5. Data 
We make use of data collected in the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS), a 
nationally representative panel survey of households. There are three rounds of data collection 
undertaken in 2003 (April-July), 2004 (May-July), and 2007 (June-December). The sampling 
method used is multistage with probability proportional to size (Kiev International Institute of 
Sociology, KIIS, 2004), and contains high quality household and individual data. The 
household questionnaire contains information about income, expenditure, household 
composition and living conditions. The individual questionnaire focuses on labor market 
status, and this information has been explored in great detail because of the richness and 
quality of the dataset (Lehmann and Terrell, 2006). It also contains a detailed retrospective 
questionnaire that allows to assess employment conditions at specific points in time 
(December 1986, 1991 and 1997), and to derive a complete reconstruction of labor market 
histories since January 1998. The 2007 questionnaire includes a set of questions on risk 
attitudes and time preferences (Dohmen, Khamis, Lehman, 2009) and a subsection focusing 
on Presidential Elections in 2004. This subsection collected information about participation in 
the protests, including motives for joining (or refraining from) the protest, type of 







For the purposes of our study, “participation” is a self-constructed term where the individuals 
declare to have been involved in the events surrounding the 2004 Elections. Overall, 
participation rates as a proportion of the total population were low, about 6% and 1.1% for the 
“Orange” and “Blue” side respectively. The degree of involvement varies, but a large majority 
of participants reported having “attended meetings, gatherings or pickets”, or having 
“distributed information materials”. Table 2 divides participants in “Orange” an “Blue” 
groups and shows percentage of participants in that group that participated in a given the type 
of activity. Overall, 50% of participants wore symbols and 71% attended meetings, gatherings 
and pickets. There are differences by groups: for example, Orange side participants were more 
likely than Blue side participants to wear symbols or to donate money to demonstrate support 
(e.g. ribbons, bows). “Blue” participants were more likely to be election observers or camping 
in public places (this may be the result of “Blue” protestors demonstrating in Kiev).  
 
Figure 1 shows participation rates by side (Orange, Blue) and region. Higher participation 
rates for the “Orange” side were evident in Kiev and in the West, whereas participation rates 
for the “Blue” was higher in the East, where they outnumbered by far self declared “Orange” 
participants. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 2 presents participation rates by the share of “Blue” votes (Yanukovych) in the First 
Election (at Oblast level). The simple correlation coefficient between the share of “Blue” and 
“Orange” (Yuschenko) votes is -0.95, so that predominantly “Blue” regions are also low in 
“Orange” votes. As expected, participation in the “Orange” side is decreasing in the share of 
“Blue” votes, with most participation occurring in areas where the share of “Blue” is under 
30%. Conversely, participation rates for the “Blue” side are bolstered in districts where the 
share of “Blue” votes exceeded 70%. As a consequence, there are Oblasts where participation  
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rates are low: these are Oblasts where neither Yanukovych nor Yuschenko captured an 
overwhelming majority of ballots. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 3 presents participation rates (Orange, Blue side) by life satisfaction. No trend is clear 
for “Blue” participants, but participation rates are increasing in life satisfaction for the 
“Orange” group. Although a crude approximation to the link between life satisfaction and the 
desire to revolt, this suggests that using life satisfaction may not be a proxy of discontent.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
 
Next, we present two alternative representations for the relationship between risk tolerance 
(explicitly or implicitly assessed as described in Appendix 1) and participation. Figure 4 plots 
participation rates by the index of explicit risk tolerance, where individuals assess their 
willingness to take risks explicitly in a scale from 0 (no willingness to take risks) to 10 
(completely willing to take risks). Individuals who are more willing to tolerate risks according 
to this index are more likely to participate in the “Orange” side, whereas no clear pattern is 
seen for those on the “Blue” side. Although a first approximation, this suggests that 
participants on the Orange side may have seen participation as a “riskier” endeavor (see 
footnote 2 for a sketch of the theoretical argument behind this assertion). Figure 5 indicates a 
less clear pattern for “Orange” participants. In this figure, risk tolerance is assessed implicitly 
by asking individuals to choose between sequential lotteries, ordered by decreasing levels of 
risk aversion. An indicator of 1 categorizes the individual among the most risk averse, 
whereas a 5 indicates the highest degree of risk tolerance detectable in the questionnaire. 




Before turning to regression results, we take a look at descriptive statistics disaggregated by 
participation status, to check if participants differ from non-participants in terms of 
observable characteristics. However, because differences may exist between “Orange” and 
“Blue” supporters (both being “participants” in a broad sense), we have divided individuals in 
3 categories: non participants, participants for the “Blue” side, and participants for the 
“Orange” side.  
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics by these three categories, as displayed in columns (1), (2), 
and (3). The fourth column tests for differences between non-participants and orange 
participants, providing the p-value of a t-test under the null of no difference between non-
participants and “Orange” for a given characteristic. The fifth column contrasts the means of 
non-participants and “Blue” participants in analogous fashion. The last column tests for 
differences between “Orange” and “Blue” participants. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Gender, unemployment rates and food poverty status are similar across the three groups. 
However, “Orange” participants are younger and more likely to be working or studying than 
are non-particpants. Clearly, economic preferences are different between “Orange” and 
“Blue” participants, with those on the “Orange” side being more likely to support an 
economic system based on market incentives, as expected. Very interestingly, “Orange” 
participants are more likely to report being satisfied with life (this can also be seen from 
Figure 3). Their participation on the Orange side is not explained by being unsatisfied with 
their personal situation. Instead, their participation on the “Orange” side was galvanized 
because the threat that a “Blue” victory might have represented on their status. This suggests 
that they went to streets not because of they lacked, but because of what they might have lost 
had they not protested against rigged election results. Participants on both sides were more 
likely to have a job in the public sector than non-participants. Although though they make up  
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a higher fraction of participants in the “Blue” side than in the “Orange” side, this difference is 
not statistically significant. “Technological connectivity” is strongly related to participating 
on the “Orange” side: they were more likely to have used internet, or had a telephone or 
mobile phone. Of course, part of this relation may be due to third factor (e.g. differences in 
cultural patterns or socioeconomic status) linking connectivity and participation, and this 
differentiation will only be clear using regression analysis. Household composition is also 
correlated with participation: lower dependency ratios (a higher fraction of members being of 
working age) are more evident among participants (either Orange or Blue) than among non-
participants. Having less dependents may, ceteris paribus, free time from caring for children 
and old age individuals, increasing available time to be used in other activities, for example to 
participate in protests.  
 
Determinants of participation 
 
The empirical approach that we use to identify determinants of participation relies on two 
elements. First, the longitudinal dimension allows us to explain participation (as reported in 
the 2007 survey) with baseline characteristics (pre-Orange revolution)
5. Second, because 
determinants of participation may be different between those in the “Blue” and “Orange” side, 
we use a multinomial logit estimation, for which the omitted category is not participating. 
Thus, the coefficients give information about which factors increase/decrease the likelihood 
that the person participates in a given “side” (Orange, Blue) with respect to non-participants. 
Table 4 is divided in two panels, each corresponding to one of the outcomes of the 
multinomial logit. The table reports relative risk ratios (RRR) with respect to the baseline 
category, so that variables that increase (decrease) the relative risk are those whose coefficient 
is greater (smaller) than 1.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
                                                 
5 The only exception are proxies for the degree of risk aversion, which are part of the 2007 questionnaire only.  
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Panel A reports relative risk estimates for participation on the “Orange” side. Column (1) 
represents a “core” model that correlates participation with basic characteristics. This includes 
usual demographic characteristics (age, education, location and household composition) as 
well an indicator that the person is a student (in the period 2003-04) and indicators that the 
person is unemployed or working. According to this baseline estimation (Column 1, Panel A), 
the relative risk of participating in the “Orange side” is higher for students and lower for 
unemployed individuals. Participation patterns and age are related through a (weak) inverted 
U-shape pattern (the rrr for age is higher than 1 but not significantly different from it). Those 
whose preferred language is Ukrainian have an increased chance of participating in the 
“Orange” side, as expected. Geographical patterns, either by population density (living in 
town or city, with omitted category living in a village) or by region (omitted category is East) 
reveal strong heterogeneity. Individuals in towns or cities are more likely to participate on the 
“Orange” side than those living in less densely populated areas, and individuals living in 
regions other than the Eastern part of the country have an increased chance of participating on 
the “Orange” side. Household composition indicators (share of pensioners and children) are 
not significant predictors of participation. At the bottom of panel A, we display basic statistics 
regarding sample size, pseudo R2 and a calculated Bayesian Information Criterion index 
(BIC) to compare models across columns. In Column (2), we add to the baseline model two 
proxies for grievances: poverty status and fraction of time the person was unemployed in the 
period 1998-2004. Neither poverty nor the fraction of time being unemployed (1998-2004) 
are significant predictors of participation for the “Orange” side, although the fraction of time 
being unemployed is borderline significant at 10% level. This result is not puzzling: long term 
unemployed may not be willing to support the “Orange” side, particularly if their long term 




In Column (3) we add to the basic model two indicators of problems in the labor market, as 
proxied by job-related problems in the last 12 months and the number of jobs lost in the last 
20 years (considering jobs declared in a retrospective fashion for years 1986, 1991 and 1997). 
It is possible a difficult transition may not matter for participation as much as recent 
unemployment experiences (in column 2 proxied by fraction of time the person was 
unemployed in the period 1998-2004). 
 
In Column (4) we observe that, as hinted in Table II, being a public employee does not 
increase the chance that the person participates on the “Orange” side.  
In Column (5) we test the hypothesis that political and economic preferences are related to 
participation. As expected, individuals leaning towards the “West” were more likely to 
participate on the “Orange” side. In terms of the BIC, Column (5) displays the most 
satisfactory model of those shown in Table 4. 
 
Column (6) introduces the share of votes at oblast level (and in the first round) that were 
reached by Yuschenko (or1) and Yanukovych (bl1). It is interesting to notice that the addition 
of these two variables makes regional indicators (Kiev, Center, West, South) not significant. 
In other words, the regional divide in participation is wholly explained by political 
preferences (as proxied by share of votes in the first round). The proxies for population 
density (town, city, with village the omitted category) remain significant. 
Column (7) shows that participation in the Orange side is more likely among individuals with 
high levels of life satisfaction and that are tolerant to risk (at least measured by the implicit 
risk index, explained in the Appendix).  
 
Having a fixed telephone line appears to increase the probability of participating on the 
“Orange” side, as shown in Column (8). This could reflect a direct impact (individuals are  
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more likely to be “connected), but it could also reflect the role of a third factor not accounted 
for the basic controls shown in Column (1). 
 
Panel B in Table 4 shows relative risks of participating on the “Blue” side. The salient 
characteristics displayed across all columns suggest that different determinants may be at play 
in this case. First, current unemployment doubles the risk of participation in the “Blue” group, 
although the statistical significant varies according to the specification. Long term 
unemployed, have, conversely, less chances of participating, as was true for the “Orange” 
side. This suggest that long term unemployed may represent a discouraged group, more than a 
group emboldened by grievances due to long term unemployment. Second, public employees 
are more likely to participate for the “Blue” side. This could be a reflection that public 
employees were more likely to be simpatize with the status quo or that they would have 
feared that “not participating” put them at risk of losing their job had the revolution failed. 
Third, the share of votes for Yanukovych (bl1) explains all regional differences that were 
previously captured by regional dummies. Fourth, the impact of risk tolerance is similar to the 
“Orange” side, with more risk tolerant individuals being more likely to participate. Finally, 
indicators of connectivity, such as internet, having a mobile or a landline telephone are not 
significant determinants of participation in the “Blue” side.  
 
Considering both equations and evaluating the BIC, models (5), (6) and (7) are preferred to 
the basic model (1). This highlights the role of political preferences (including those 
represented by the share of votes in the first election), attitudes and perceptions (risk 
tolerance, life satisfaction) as well as the basic controls involved in equation (1). 
 




The richness of the political participation module of ULMS allows us to differentiate 
participants in by their role in the protest. Participants were asked about their role in the 
protests, with 6 categories of participation (refused answer, does not know and other are 
additional categories, but few participants opted for these options). Table 5 displays these 
categories, disaggregating by Blue and Orange participants. According to the Pearson’s χ
2 
test, proportions are similar among these two groups. Because further disaggregation reduces 
cell sizes for the “Blue” participants, in what follows we carry the analysis by role only for 
“Orange” side participants.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We group the 6 categories into two main groups of participants, “followers” and “organizers”, 
with organizers being those who considered themselves “very active participant”, “being part 
of the organizational team” and “being a leading organizer”. Figure 6 shows the grouping for 
“Orange” participants in these two categories (i.e. followers, organizers). 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
To identify determinants that select individuals into these groups, we employ a multinomial 
logit model, with the base category being non-participants, and in which “Blue” participants 
are excluded from the estimation: integrating them in the baseline category of “non-
participants” is not appropriate given the results shown in the previous section. 
Table 6 displays the results in two panels. Panel A reports relative risk ratios for being 
“followers” compared to non-participants, and panel B reports relative risk ratios for 
“organizers” compared to the same base category.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We start with a basic model displayed in Column (1) and test the role of additional covariates 
in the same fashion applied for Table 4. Many interesting results emerge comparing results 
between both panels. Students are more likely to participate as “followers” (with RRR values  
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between 2 and 3), but this does not make them more likely to be “organizers”. Education does 
not significantly increase the chances of being “followers”, but does increase the chances of 
being “organizers”. Women are as likely as men to be “followers”, but they are substantially 
less likely to participate as “organizers”. Finally, political preferences, increases the chances 
of being “follower” and “organizers”, but its effect is stronger for organizers. In sum, women 
and students appear to be driving those engaging in moderate participation, whereas to be 
“organizer” requires political motivation and higher levels of education. Models (5), (6), and 
(7) appear to better represent trends than the baseline model (1), at least by using the BIC 
indicator to choose between these models. 
 
 
Timing of Participation 
 
Deciding when to participate is another decision that might be taking by a would-be 
participant. Lohmann (1994) presents evidence on five “cycles” of protests, using information 
about the number and turnout of protests from pre-unification East Germany (GDR) between 
January 1989 and September 1990. Her research suggests that “informational cascades” may 
shape participation dynamics.  
 
Table 7 shows the disaggregation of timing of participation in the ULMS political 
participation module. There are 5 categories relating to periods before and after the three elect 
ions. The relation with the timing of elections is particularly helpful to reduce the potential for 
recall bias that may arise if individuals were inquired about specific dates rather than a time 
window associated with key events. As Table 7 indicates, most participants joined the protests 
by early December (that is, soon after the second election results were announced).  
[Insert Table 7 here]  
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There is evidence of dissimilarities between “Blue” and “Orange” participants, as attested by 
Pearson’s  χ
2 test displayed next to the Table. “Orange” protestors were joining the 
demonstrations right after the second election, whereas “Blue” participants were more likely 
to be active before the first election (by participating in political rallies or as observer en in 
the first election) and right before the third election (perhaps to challenge the “Orange” 




This paper represents an empirical account (the first in its nature) of the determinants and 
intensity of participation in the crucial “Orange” revolution. Our study is unique in that 
longitudinal data avoids the “ex-post” rationalizations that cross-sectional studies have. The 
occurrence of the protest (as opposed to a hypothetical situation) allows us to differentiate 
from studies where the “willingness” to revolt is interpreted as if it reflected the decision 
making process of a citizen confronting the real prospect of a massive protest. 
 
The richness of our dataset allowed us to provide an extensive account of factors involved 
with participation that are absent in other studies, such as the “intensity” with which 
participants demonstrated and a very detailed questionnaire that elicits risk attitudes and an in 
depth account of potential grievances, such as poor labor market outcomes. 
 
Many of our findings resonate with the motto of participants in the protest “Razom nas 
bahato!” (Together we are many). Coordination mechanisms (the occurrence of protests in 
densely populated areas, with individuals “connected” to each other) are central to 
participation in these protests. We also account for differences in the profile of “protestors”  
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(Orange) and “counter-protestors” (Blue), thus we bring a much richer story than in protests 
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Table 1: Definitions and Summary Statistics
6 





General Individual and Household Characteristics: 
 
female  Indicator: Person is female.   0.572 0.495
ukrainian  Indicator: Ukrainian is preferred language.
7  0.338 0.473







Person has attended an educational institution since 
April (May, June) 2003.
8 
Indicator: Primary/ Unfinished Secondary Education
9 
Indicator: General Secondary/ Vocational Education 
Indicator: Professional Secondary/ Unfinished Higher 
















hhsize  Number of household members/ all household 









Fraction of time 1998-2004 when the person was 
unemployed 








emppublic  Indicator: Person employed in public sector in 
2004(budgetary organization, state or local public 
enterprise).  
0.167 0.373
ownshouse  Indicator: House owner in 2004  0.624 0.484
ownsmore  Household owns a dacha, garden, garden cottage, 
summer house or another house, apartment or part of 
an apartment.  
0.0947 0.293
unemp  Person did not work during reference week in 2004, 
but was looking for a job during last four weeks (was 
engaged in job seeking or planning to start own 
enterprise or farm) 
0.0816 0.274
poorpr  Person is ‘poor’ (using regional food poverty line)
11  0.216 0.411
                                                 
6 Unless otherwise specified, information was collected in the wave implemented in 2004. 
7 The person reports speaking Ukrainian (either only Ukrainian or more often than Russian) or reports using both languages (i.e. Ukrainian 
and Russian) equally , but replies in Ukrainian. 
 
8 Person attended an “educational institution” between may/june 2003 and the date of the interview (2004).  
9 These categories follow the classification given in Kupets (2006). 
10 During the last week, the person a) worked at least one hour and was paid (in money or in kind), b)was employed in entrepreneurship, 
business activities, individual work, worked on a family enterprise or on a farm, as a freelancer or as a registered entrepreneur, c) had a job or 
own business in the last week at which was temporarily absent or not employed (due to illness, vacations, training, maternity or parental 




poorfr  Person is ‘food poor’ (using regional food poverty 
line)  
0.0550 0.228
     
pensshare  Share of pensioners in household (females ages 55+, 












Share of working age adults (females:15-55, males 
15-60) in household. 
  
Person was unemployed, had delayed wage payments    
(arrears) or was on forced leave in last 12months 
At least one person in the household was unemployed, 
had delayed wage payments (arrears) or was on forced 
leave in last 12months 
cumulative number of events where individual lost 
job involuntarily (closingdown of plan/reorganization, 
bankrupcy/privatization/dismissed/personnel 
reduction/expiring contract or probation time), based 




















Individual Preferences and Satisfaction: 
 
suitcentral  Indicator:Economic system desired for Ukraine is 
“Centrally-planned economy which was in our 
country until perestroika” or “Centrally-planned 
economy, but with elements of a market economy”. 
Interview held in 2004.
12 
0.536  0.499
suitmarket  Indicator: Economic system desired for Ukraine is 
“Market economy with strong government 
regulation”, “Market economy with relatively small 
government interventions” or “Free market 
economy”. Interview held in 2004. 
0.415  0.493
westdem  Indicator: Political system desired is „Western-type 
democracy“
13 
Indicator: Political system desired is „the soviet 
system which was in our country until Perestroika“ or 





lifesatplus  Indicator: Person is either “fully satisfied” or 
“satisfied” with his/her life.
14 
0.279 0.449




                                                                                                                                                          
11 Poverty indicators are taken from Brück et. al. (2008) See contextual information, methodology, and references listed therein. 
12 Based on the question: “What kind of economic system, in your opinion, is most suitable for Ukraine?” Answers possible were “centrally-
planned economy which was in our country until Perestroika”, “centrally-planned economy, but with elements of a market economy”, “the 
economic system which exists today”, “market economy with strong government regulation” “market economy with relatively small 
government interventions” and “free market economy without government regulation”, “other”, “does not know”, and “refuses to answer”. 
13 Based on the question: “What kind of political system would your like your children to live under?” Answers possible were “The Soviet 
system which was in our country until Perestroika”, “The Soviet system, but in a different, more democratic form”, “The political system 
which exists today”, “Western-type democracy”, “Other”, “does not know”, and “refuses to answer”. 
 
14 Based on the question: “To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present time?” Possible answers are “Fully 
satisfied”, “Satisfied”, “Rather satisfied”, “Less than satisfied” “Not satisfied at all”, “does not know”, and “refuses to answer”. 
 
15 Based on the question: “Tell me, please” how satisfied are you with your current job?” Possible answers are “Fully satisfied”, “Satisfied”, 






Social Connectivity/ Integration 
 
socialexchange  Index of social exchange (index taking values 0,1,2) 
as follows: 
Index=1 if the household has either a) received gifts 
or money or b) gave money / gifts (to friends, 
relatives or ‘other people’ that do not belong to the 
household or in donations)  
Index=2 if the household met criteria a) and b) 









fixedtel  Person has a telephone at home in his/her household.  0.355  0.478






town  Person lives in a town (urban settlement with less than 
100000 inhabitants). 
0.187  0.390
city  Person lives in a city (urban settlement with more 
than 100000 inhabitants). 
0.275  0.447
West  Person lives in the ‘West’ of Ukraine. The category 
refers to the following oblasti: Volynska, 
Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivenska, 
Ternopilska, Khmelnytska and Chernivetska. 
0.156  0.363
East  Person lives in the ‘East’ of Ukraine. This category 
refers to the following oblasti: Donetska, Luhanska 
and Kharkivska. 
0.172  0.378
South  Person lives in the ‘South’ of Ukraine. This category 
refers to the following oblasti: Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea, Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizhska, 
Mykolayevska, Odeska, Khersonska. 
0.165  0.372
Kiev  Person lives in Kiev city.    0.033  0.178
    








Center   Person lives in the ‘Center’ of Ukraine. This category 
refers to the following oblasti: Kyivska, Vinnytska, 






Notes: The mean and linearized standard errors are weighted using sampling weights and adjusted for survey design effects. An indicator 
variable (also known as dummy indicator variable) is such that if the condition in the question is satisfied, the variable takes value 1 and 0 
otherwise. 











(Orange or Blue) 
Test: 
Orange=Blue 
P ≥ | t |
I was wearing ribbons, bows, and/or 
other symbols. 
53.7% 26.6% 49.5% 0.000***
I distributed information materials, 
stickers, etc. 
15.8% 20.0% 16.5% 0.479
I attended meetings, gatherings, 
pickets, etc. 
73.0% 61.9% 71.3% 0.117
I supported my side by giving 
money. 
7.4% 1.4% 6.5% 0.012**
I supported my side by supplying 
them with food or other resources. 
5.8% 0.4% 5.0% 0.001***
I participated in seizures and/or 
blockades of governmental 
buildings. 
2.1% 0.0% 1.8% 0.064*
I was an official election observer. 6.4% 20.0% 8.5%  0.021**
I camped on public places.  1.7% 8.0% 2.7%  0.077*
OTHER   3.6% 2.4% 3.5%  0.504
Note: N= 388 Proportions calculated using sampling weights. * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
Source: ULMS data and own calculations.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Key Variables by Participation Status 
















female 0.556  0.542  0.612 0.695  0.760  0.666 
age  4.566 4.000  4.195  0.000*** 0.679  0.142 
educ  5.646 6.929  6.186  0.000*** 0.018**  0.011** 
student0304  0.099 0.222  0.087  0.000*** 0.894  0.029** 
worked  0.550 0.624  0.585  0.028** 0.598  0.591 
unemp  0.079 0.078  0.154  0.945 0.127 0.151 
suitcentral  0.549 0.255  0.516  0.000*** 0.738  0.015** 
suitmarket  0.399 0.712  0.462  0.000*** 0.528  0.022** 
lifesatplus  0.273 0.462  0.256  0.000*** 0.792 0.005*** 
jobsatplus  0.278 0.354  0.228  0.020** 0.551  0.085* 
ukrainian  0.454 0.698  0.217  0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
emppublic  0.267 0.377  0.430  0.002*** 0.017**  0.468 
internet  0.078 0.251  0.059  0.000*** 0.638 0.000*** 
socialexchange  0.417 0.437  0.603  0.642 0.402 0.332 
ownshouse  0.866 0.888  0.857  0.232 0.646 0.857 
ownsmore  0.141 0.203  0.083  0.143 0.163  0.043** 
fixedtel  0.489 0.758  0.361  0.000*** 0.183 0.000*** 
mobile  0.175 0.301  0.195  0.003*** 0.613  0.154 
poorpr  0.208 0.155  0.152  0.035** 0.252  0.837 
poorfr 0.055  0.046  0.067  0.367  0.920  0.676 
hhsize  3.337 3.526  3.300  0.076* 0.984  0.346 
pensshare  0.224 0.122  0.110  0.000*** 0.010**  0.916 
workageshare  0.635 0.726  0.770  0.000*** 0.014**  0.710 
town  0.271 0.313  0.309  0.321 0.465 0.989 
city  0.402 0.502  0.308  0.025** 0.317 0.034** 
West  0.196 0.458  0.054  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
East  0.227 0.011  0.574  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
South  0.254 0.098  0.183  0.000*** 0.334  0.157 
Kiev  0.055 0.185  0.039  0.000*** 0.631 0.001*** 
            
Notes: * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 


















Table 4 Multinomial Logit of Participation by Side (Orange, Blue) 
Panel A: Equation for “Orange”side (Omitted category: Non-participating) 
relative risk ratios (rrr) displayed 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
worked 0.87 0.859 0.858 0.842 0.917 0.901 0.866 0.821
[0.140] [0.138] [0.141] [0.137] [0.183] [0.147] [0.142] [0.130]
student0304 2.298*** 2.302*** 2.277*** 2.234*** 2.576*** 2.148** 2.191** 2.049**
[0.700] [0.700] [0.695] [0.677] [0.935] [0.656] [0.675] [0.624]
unemp 0.519* 0.574 0.469* 0.530* 0.476 0.510* 0.591 0.508*
[0.192] [0.216] [0.206] [0.196] [0.243] [0.197] [0.214] [0.193]
age 1.056 1.064 1.045 1.038 1.082 1.065 1.073* 1.065
[0.0435] [0.0441] [0.0440] [0.0450] [0.0603] [0.0438] [0.0451] [0.0452]
age2 0.999* 0.999** 0.999 0.999 0.999* 0.999** 0.999** 0.999**
[0.000438] [0.000443] [0.000447] [0.000461] [0.000584] [0.000436] [0.000447] [0.000453]
educ 0.99 0.994 0.986 0.99 0.906 0.935 1.016 0.945
[0.139] [0.141] [0.140] [0.139] [0.153] [0.133] [0.147] [0.133]
educ2 1.015 1.014 1.016 1.015 1.017 1.017 1.011 1.016
[0.0107] [0.0109] [0.0109] [0.0107] [0.0130] [0.0110] [0.0110] [0.0109]
female 0.85 0.832 0.857 0.839 0.886 0.884 0.951 0.855
[0.123] [0.121] [0.124] [0.121] [0.153] [0.130] [0.144] [0.123]
ukrainian 1.890*** 1.862*** 1.917*** 1.859*** 2.015** 1.429 2.187*** 1.951***
[0.419] [0.415] [0.427] [0.412] [0.554] [0.350] [0.528] [0.447]
town 2.442*** 2.435*** 2.472*** 2.392*** 2.627*** 2.194*** 2.600*** 2.164***
[0.653] [0.649] [0.662] [0.635] [0.791] [0.597] [0.702] [0.586]
city 2.196*** 2.202*** 2.215*** 2.171*** 2.253** 2.807*** 2.273*** 1.663*
[0.566] [0.569] [0.573] [0.557] [0.712] [0.728] [0.614] [0.458]
Kiev 45.78*** 44.85*** 45.65*** 44.93*** 38.61*** 0.776 49.11*** 36.14***
[36.77] [36.01] [36.73] [36.14] [40.27] [1.147] [39.41] [29.01]
Center 14.84*** 14.87*** 14.77*** 14.80*** 17.83*** 0.729 13.27*** 13.52***
[11.79] [11.83] [11.73] [11.78] [18.41] [0.989] [10.52] [10.74]
West 35.56*** 36.48*** 35.57*** 36.07*** 35.43*** 0.283 33.05*** 30.60***
[28.18] [28.86] [28.23] [28.61] [36.61] [0.405] [26.15] [24.16]
South 7.709** 7.796** 7.665** 7.799** 7.732* 3.31 6.482** 7.148**

































Constant 0.000456*** 0.000447*** 0.000535*** 0.000631*** 0.000198*** 0.000412** 0.000109*** 0.000399***
[0.000546] [0.000544] [0.000643] [0.000765] [0.000316] [0.00138] [0.000139] [0.000487]
Observations 4999 4987 4999 4999 3476 4890 4892 4999
seudo Rsquare 0.175 0.179 0.177 0.178 0.22 0.207 0.198 0.184
log-likelihood -1192 -1186 -1190 -1188 -836.7 -1139 -1138 -1179
ers estimated ( 30 34 34 32 34 34 38 36




Panel B: Equation for “Blue”side (Omitted category: Non-participating), rrr displayed  
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
worked 1.011 0.956 1.098 0.859 1.095 1.012 1.011 1.013
[0.317] [0.304] [0.340] [0.274] [0.386] [0.321] [0.321] [0.319]
student0304 0.537 0.517 0.557 0.531 0.788 0.533 0.521 0.554
[0.346] [0.336] [0.363] [0.343] [0.440] [0.357] [0.327] [0.355]
unemp 1.894 2.374** 3.162* 1.958 2.077 2.047 2.099* 1.927
[0.849] [1.021] [2.207] [0.873] [1.085] [0.920] [0.927] [0.862]
age 0.919 0.937 0.938 0.884* 0.954 0.918 0.908 0.916
[0.0621] [0.0644] [0.0678] [0.0590] [0.0643] [0.0623] [0.0625] [0.0633]
age2 1.001 1 1.001 1.001* 1 1.001 1.001 1.001
[0.000715] [0.000728] [0.000763] [0.000705] [0.000721] [0.000719] [0.000727] [0.000729]
educ 3.778*** 3.919*** 3.811*** 3.646*** 3.228*** 3.605*** 4.021*** 3.785***
[1.394] [1.461] [1.404] [1.345] [1.356] [1.326] [1.530] [1.389]
educ2 0.909*** 0.906*** 0.908*** 0.910*** 0.919*** 0.914*** 0.903*** 0.910***
[0.0259] [0.0260] [0.0257] [0.0258] [0.0298] [0.0257] [0.0270] [0.0255]
female 1.337 1.377 1.358 1.341 1.223 1.358 1.574 1.341
[0.428] [0.447] [0.435] [0.434] [0.485] [0.439] [0.505] [0.428]
ukrainian 0.539 0.509 0.522 0.552 0.527 0.682 0.578 0.549
[0.263] [0.255] [0.261] [0.266] [0.289] [0.341] [0.297] [0.272]
town 0.564 0.57 0.564 0.551 0.437* 0.526 0.507 0.572
[0.261] [0.265] [0.260] [0.252] [0.211] [0.247] [0.254] [0.260]
city 0.298** 0.293** 0.296** 0.304** 0.164*** 0.290** 0.264** 0.303**
[0.151] [0.149] [0.149] [0.151] [0.0940] [0.149] [0.146] [0.142]
Kiev 0.481 0.461 0.482 0.474 0.338 3.302 0.5 0.538
[0.336] [0.324] [0.339] [0.332] [0.315] [4.749] [0.355] [0.370]
Center 0.236*** 0.240*** 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.205*** 1.201 0.196*** 0.242***
[0.0987] [0.100] [0.0996] [0.101] [0.101] [0.949] [0.0794] [0.101]
West 0.125** 0.130** 0.126** 0.126** 0.0772* 0.704 0.104*** 0.127**
[0.107] [0.112] [0.108] [0.109] [0.108] [1.558] [0.0891] [0.111]
South 0.280*** 0.281*** 0.284*** 0.291*** 0.181*** 0.654 0.241*** 0.291***

































Constant 0.00755*** 0.00600*** 0.00519*** 0.0158*** 0.00753*** 0.000149*** 0.00412*** 0.00771***
[0.0117] [0.00945] [0.00822] [0.0244] [0.0126] [0.000380] [0.00747] [0.0123]
Observations 4999 4987 4999 4999 3476 4890 4892 4999
seudo Rsquare 0.175 0.179 0.177 0.178 0.22 0.207 0.198 0.184
log-likelihood -1192 -1186 -1190 -1188 -836.7 -1139 -1138 -1179
ers estimated ( 30 34 34 32 34 34 38 36
BIC 2639.51 2661.50 2669.58 2648.54 1950.62 2566.83 2598.82 2664.61   
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Table 5  Multinomial Logit of Participation Intensity (Orange side) 
Panel A: Equation for “Participating, but not actively” (Omitted category: Non-participating) 
relative risk ratios 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
worked 0.818 0.813 0.797 0.785 0.776 0.857 0.833 0.769
[0.155] [0.152] [0.154] [0.151] [0.184] [0.163] [0.161] [0.144]
student0304 2.796*** 2.795*** 2.780*** 2.687*** 3.763*** 2.616*** 2.678*** 2.460***
[0.887] [0.881] [0.884] [0.846] [1.461] [0.844] [0.816] [0.819]
unemp 0.536 0.594 0.453* 0.55 0.382* 0.53 0.634 0.52
[0.213] [0.237] [0.216] [0.218] [0.219] [0.215] [0.251] [0.210]
age 1.095** 1.102** 1.086* 1.072 1.146** 1.104** 1.113** 1.103**
[0.0500] [0.0498] [0.0508] [0.0517] [0.0740] [0.0505] [0.0516] [0.0512]
age2 0.999** 0.999*** 0.999** 0.999* 0.998** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999**
[0.000482] [0.000480] [0.000493] [0.000508] [0.000671] [0.000479] [0.000493] [0.000491]
educ 1.127 1.137 1.122 1.127 1.064 1.05 1.153 1.066
[0.194] [0.200] [0.195] [0.194] [0.216] [0.178] [0.202] [0.184]
educ2 1.006 1.005 1.006 1.005 1.005 1.009 1.002 1.007
[0.0129] [0.0132] [0.0131] [0.0129] [0.0154] [0.0129] [0.0132] [0.0132]
female 1.011 0.994 1.022 0.995 0.921 1.065 1.068 1.014
[0.168] [0.168] [0.171] [0.167] [0.185] [0.180] [0.181] [0.168]
ukrainian 1.668** 1.650** 1.685** 1.628** 1.763** 1.189 1.897*** 1.709**
[0.376] [0.371] [0.381] [0.367] [0.470] [0.298] [0.462] [0.399]
town 2.853*** 2.872*** 2.883*** 2.785*** 2.944*** 2.582*** 2.795*** 2.469***
[0.894] [0.902] [0.906] [0.866] [1.050] [0.814] [0.890] [0.771]
city 2.172*** 2.171*** 2.188*** 2.141*** 2.391** 2.956*** 2.148** 1.619
[0.644] [0.643] [0.650] [0.631] [0.865] [0.889] [0.673] [0.515]
Kiev 75.07*** 73.94*** 75.60*** 73.40*** 81.56*** 0.605 75.90*** 56.97***
[56.74] [55.92] [57.24] [55.63] [84.82] [0.970] [57.66] [42.91]
Center 19.67*** 19.62*** 19.64*** 19.62*** 34.06*** 0.572 18.21*** 17.42***
[14.75] [14.73] [14.73] [14.74] [35.26] [0.830] [13.70] [13.07]
West 42.12*** 42.68*** 42.35*** 42.90*** 56.89*** 0.113 38.35*** 35.07***
[31.64] [32.02] [31.86] [32.22] [58.72] [0.184] [28.85] [26.22]
South 7.335** 7.363** 7.278** 7.447** 8.261** 2.876 5.446** 6.600**





























Constant 7.20e-05*** 6.90e-05*** 8.13e-05*** 0.000109*** 1.42e-05*** 2.95e-05*** 2.38e-05*** 6.73e-05***
[9.40e-05] [9.10e-05] [0.000106] [0.000145] [2.62e-05] [0.000113] [3.32e-05] [8.93e-05]
Observations 4963 4951 4963 4963 3449 4851 4857 4963
seudo Rsquare 0.185 0.188 0.187 0.186 0.233 0.222 0.201 0.197
log-likelihood -1059 -1054 -1057 -1057 -740.7 -1005 -1020 -1044
ers estimated ( 30 34 34 32 34 34 34 36




Panel B: Equation for “Active” participation (Omitted category: Non-participating) 
relative risk ratios  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
worked 0.979 0.943 0.998 0.978 1.441 0.985 1.006 0.92
[0.340] [0.329] [0.340] [0.342] [0.559] [0.344] [0.343] [0.320]
student0304 1.317 1.323 1.28 1.308 0.956 1.293 1.206 1.167
[0.814] [0.819] [0.784] [0.806] [0.615] [0.795] [0.746] [0.690]
unemp 0.469 0.506 0.517 0.47 0.882 0.453 0.469 0.472
[0.404] [0.437] [0.485] [0.406] [0.768] [0.401] [0.396] [0.412]
age 0.958 0.964 0.939 0.957 0.937 0.971 0.951 0.971
[0.0966] [0.0962] [0.0939] [0.0989] [0.106] [0.0992] [0.0917] [0.104]
a g e 2 11111111
[0.00110] [0.00109] [0.00109] [0.00113] [0.00123] [0.00111] [0.00105] [0.00117]
educ 0.733 0.719 0.728 0.734 0.661 0.711 0.735 0.724
[0.194] [0.193] [0.195] [0.194] [0.203] [0.190] [0.194] [0.201]
educ2 1.036* 1.037* 1.037* 1.036* 1.038* 1.037* 1.036* 1.033
[0.0209] [0.0214] [0.0212] [0.0210] [0.0234] [0.0209] [0.0211] [0.0214]
female 0.469** 0.453*** 0.470** 0.469*** 0.747 0.481** 0.475** 0.471**
[0.139] [0.133] [0.140] [0.138] [0.239] [0.143] [0.144] [0.141]
ukrainian 3.458** 3.431** 3.604** 3.456** 3.554** 2.872* 3.287** 3.770**
[1.839] [1.813] [1.933] [1.842] [2.183] [1.645] [1.702] [2.008]
town 1.613 1.555 1.643 1.608 2.118* 1.454 1.713 1.522
[0.668] [0.648] [0.680] [0.669] [0.949] [0.622] [0.714] [0.655]
city 2.289** 2.311** 2.335** 2.288** 1.994 2.548** 2.639** 1.752
[0.919] [0.922] [0.931] [0.923] [0.915] [1.000] [1.065] [0.747]
Kiev 2.276 2.19 2.203 2.283 1.731 0.174 2.275 1.907
[3.288] [3.164] [3.187] [3.297] [2.540] [0.390] [3.292] [2.759]
Center 5.481 5.502 5.384 5.487 3.489 0.791 5.347 5.224
[6.194] [6.222] [6.084] [6.181] [4.173] [1.475] [6.017] [5.867]
West 17.80*** 18.87*** 17.42*** 17.75*** 10.55** 1.101 18.01*** 15.57**
[19.25] [20.36] [18.85] [19.25] [12.21] [2.096] [19.50] [16.70]
South 7.851* 8.140** 7.819* 7.849* 6.395* 4.229 7.345* 7.620*





























Constant 0.00573** 0.00677** 0.00803** 0.00582** 0.00707** 0.0123 0.00294*** 0.00396**
[0.0118] [0.0139] [0.0165] [0.0120] [0.0163] [0.0636] [0.00614] [0.00877]
Observations 4963 4951 4963 4963 3449 4851 4857 4963
seudo Rsquare 0.185 0.188 0.187 0.186 0.233 0.222 0.201 0.197
log-likelihood -1059 -1054 -1057 -1057 -740.7 -1005 -1020 -1044
ers estimated ( 30 34 34 32 34 34 34 36
BIC 2373.29 2397.25 2403.33 2386.31 1758.36 2298.56 2328.60 2394.35  





Table 6: Function in the Political Activities of participation  
Question: Tell me, please, how would you describe your function in the political activities? 
 






Refused to answer  1.2%  0.00%  1.1% 
Doesn’t know  2.5%  2.8%  2.5% 
I was a leading organizer.  0.5%  0.00%  0.4% 
I belonged to the organization team.  4.8%  4.6%  4.8% 
I was a very active participant. 17.4%  17.3%  17.4% 
I was a regular participant.  20.1%  15.8%  19.4% 
I participated, but more as a reserved participant. 48.2%  57.9%  49.7% 
I supported the organizers and protested.  4.7%  0.0%  3.9% 
OTHER   0.7%  1.6%  0.9% 
N= 315  74  389 
Note: Proportions calculated using sampling weights.  
Uweighted test of equality of proportions, Pearson χ






Table 7: Beginning of Participation 
Question: Please try to remember when you started participating in these political activities 
 
   Orange   Blue  Total
RA 1.45  0.00 1.22
DS 15.24  13.13 14.91
Person started participating...   
…before the first election round (before 31
st October 2004)  18.65  24.18 19.52


















…after the third election round (after 26
th December 2004)  1.53  1.86 1.59
N=  309 74 383
Pearson χ
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Appendix 1: Risk taking assessment 
We measure attitudes toward risk implicitly and explicitly by using information on a module 
employed to measure risk taking behavior.  
 
An explicit measure of risk aversion is captured by the variable “riskexp”. It is based a scale 









We also rely on an implicit measure of risk aversion, elicited by asking individuals to decide 































Participants are also allowed to refuse answering or answer “Don’t know”.  
Based on these four questions (rows 1 to 4), we create a variable riskimp that can take five 
values as follows: 
riskimp=1 if response for question 1 is option A (lowest level of tolerance among 
respondents). 
riskimp =2 if response in question 1 is option B, but option A is chosen in question 2. 
riskimp =3 if response for questions 1 and 2 is option B, but option A is chosen for question 3. 
riskimp =4 if response for questions 1, 2 and 3 is option A, but option A is chosen for 
question 4. 
riskimp =5 if response for questions 1,2, 3 and 4 is always option B (highest level of risk 
tolerance among respondents). 
 
 